Modelling the Eurozone as an Extraordinary Exchange Rate Union

The Trans-European Automated Real-Time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) imbalances within the Eurozone can be interpreted as a sign of a missing balance of payments adjustment mechanism for the member countries. As the Eurozone lacks a fiscal union, in theory it is more of an exchange rate union or a system of fixed exchange rates than a monetary union. This paper will show why the TARGET is a crucial indicator for the Eurozone not being a monetary union but instead an exchange rate union, and why countries holding TARGET liabilities against the European System of Central Banks can be compared to a reserve currency country, like the US under the Bretton-Woods System.     

Measuring agents’ reaction to private and public information in games with strategic complementarities

In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because public signals are more informative about the likely behavior of others. We present an experiment in which agents’ optimal actions are a weighted average of the fundamental state and their expectations of other agents’ actions. We measure the responses to public and private signals. We find that, on average, subjects put a larger weight on the public signal. In line with theoretical predictions, as the relative weight of the coordination component in a player’s utility increases, players put more weight on the public signal when making their choices. However, the weight is smaller than in equilibrium, which indicates that subjects underestimate the information contained in public signals about other players’ beliefs.     

Cultural patterns influencing project team behavior in Sub‐Saharan Africa: A case study in Ethiopia

Despite the increasing attention paid to the human element of project success found in the project management literature, empirical studies exploring cultural patterns influencing this particular human element continue to be far from satisfactory. To help further understand the influence of cultural patterns within Sub‐Saharan Africa project environments, we draw on a case study conducted in Ethiopia's service sector. Apart from the well‐perceived cultural values commonly referred to in the existing literature, we specifically investigated the deep‐rooted underlying causes, which include Ethiopian cultural habits, as a principal factor in influencing project team behavior. The article concludes with implications and recommendations for future research.     

Gesetzliche Rente: Bedeutet Teilhabeäquivalenz Verteilungsneutralität? — Ein weiterer Irrtum

A basic principle of statutory retirement insurance in Germany is the proportionality between earnings and retirement benefits called “Teilhabeäquivalenz”. Advocates of the system defend this principle, arguing that it ensures distributive neutrality. However, this assertion is wrong because the principle combines two concepts with different time dimensions: lifetime contributions and monthly retirement benefits. If clearly defined population groups differ in their life expectancy, then this very principle achieves income redistribution, in the German case from low earners to high earners. We propose a simple change in the rules which would avoid this undesirable redistribution.     

International order and individual liberty

This article takes issue with the traditional way of conceptualizing international relations as anarchy. While the “anarchy problematique” has become established wisdom of neorealist (structuralist) international relations theory, neither the historical record, nor the analytical power, of this approach is borne out by closer examination. The elimination of questions concerning individual liberty, and the exclusion from analysis of international and domestic institutions serving this end, have been pursued in the vain hope of formulating a systematic and parsimonious theory of international politics. p ]On the basis of an examination of the post-war era, in which issues of stable democratic regimes and liberal international institutions were of primary importance, this article suggests an alternative approach for the study of international politics. By conceptualizing both the domestic and international systems associal systems, differing in degree and kind of institutionalized behavior, particular attention is directed to the link between individual rights and domestic institutions, as well as to the linkage of domestic and international structures. The metaphor of a “game,” constituted by rules and norms, is particularly helpful in providing an alternative research program. This approach is not only more attuned to political practice, it also allows for the stringent examination of normative questions. In preparing this paper, I was helped by the support of the Liberty Fund and by my research assistant, Rey Koslowski. I also thank colleagues Joe Grieco, Joseph Nye, Michaela Richter, David Spiro as well as two anonymous referees of this journal who provided helpful suggestions. Lawrence B. Simon Professor of Political Science; University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6215.     

VOTING ON SOCIAL SECURITY WHEN LABOR SUPPLY IS ENDOGENOUS†

One of the puzzles in the political economic theory of unfunded pension systems is that middle-aged voters do not seem to advocate unlimited increases in the level of contributions and benefits if they take this decision to be valid forever. While the previous literature answered this question by pointing at borrowing restrictions, a more convincing explanation rests on the voters’understanding that future social security taxes will adversely affect future labor supply and thus the source from which their own pensions must be financed. This paper analyzes the validity of this explanation for two different types of pension systems, (a) the lump-sum benefits case, and (b) the case of fairness within cohorts.     

A GENERAL PROOF OF THE DYBVIG-INGERSOLL-ROSS THEOREM: LONG FORWARD RATES CAN NEVER FALL

A senera1 proof of the Dybvig-Ingersoll-Ross Theorem o n thc monotonicity of long foraard rates is presented. Some inconsistencies in the original proof o f this theorein are discussed.     

Auf dem Wege zum Bundesfinanzrat!

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat am 19.10.2006 sein Urteil in der Normenkontrollklage des Landes Berlin wegen Haushaltsnotlage verkündet, nach dem Berlin leer ausgeht. Das Urteil l?st jedoch nicht die grundlegenden Probleme des bundesdeutschen Finanzf?deralismus. Deshalb tut konzeptionelles Nachdenken über die Neuordnung der Finanzbeziehungen zwischen Bund und L?ndern not. Dies hat unter Federführung von Prof. Charles B. Blankart der wissenschaftliche Beirat des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums in einem Gutachten getan.¹ Prof. Markus C. Kerber untersucht den darin enthaltenen Vorschlag eines „F?deralismus mit beschr?nkter Haftung“.